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Picking Over the CFI Microsoft Judgment
of 17 September, 2007
By Dr. Philip Marsden*
The two abuses alleged by the Commission were confirmed
by the Court as meriting a record fine of E497.2 million, since
"Microsoft committed a single infringement, namely the application
of a strategy consisting in leveraging its dominant position on the
client PC operating systems market."'

Tying
Here the Court found that the Commission had proven that
Microsoft tied two separate products (Windows and Media Player);
Windows was dominant in the operating system market, thus
customers who bought it were 'coerced' into taking Media Player as
well; this foreclosed competition in the market for media players and
was not objectively justifiable.
The Court thus rejected Microsoft's arguments that, inter alia,
the products weren't separate: Windows just had media functionality,
so there could be no 'tie'; and that while there was separate demand
for an operating system and for media players, there was no separate
demand for an operating system without a media player (the 'laceless
shoes' argument); customers who bought Windows received Media
Player but were not forced to use it and could readily download rival
players; such players had thrived during the period of the abuse (the
leading media player in the world currently being Flashplayer), and
that product improvement was an objectively justifiable strategy for a
dominant firm and to disallow it would guarantee consumers
degraded products with less functionality.
The Court upheld the Commission's remedy of requiring that
Microsoft create Windows XPN - i.e. a degraded version of
Windows without a Media Player, for the European market, and sell
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it for the same price as Windows XP. The Commission had rejected
Microsoft's offer to ship Windows with a CD of competing media
players, rather than degrade its own product. Going forward then,
Microsoft is free to add new functionality to Windows or Vista, so
long as it provides a product without such improvements for
European consumers.

Refusal to Deal
The Court began by giving Microsoft the benefit of the doubt
that its interoperability protocols were protected intellectual property,
a fact that was hotly disputed by the complainants. As such, the
Court stated that Microsoft could only be forced to divulge such
information in "exceptional circumstances". Drawing from case law
including Magill and IMS Health, the Court ruled that such
exceptional circumstances were satisfied in this case since the
information refused was indispensable for competitors to develop
competing products and remain viable; the refusal led to a risk that
effective competition would be eliminated; the refusal prevented the
potential emergence of new or merely different products; and there
was no objective justification for the refusal.
The Court thus rejected Microsoft's arguments that
competitors were currently designing new products without access to
the protocols; Commission intervention in IP rights should be based
on a clear likelihood - rather than a mere risk - of harm; access to the
protocols would allow rivals to clone Microsoft's operating system
(essentially, like giving away the recipe for Coke) forced sharing of
its proprietary information would reduce its incentives to innovate in
the future.
The Court held that "on balance, the possible negative impact
of an order to supply on Microsoft's incentives to innovate is
outweighed by its positive impact on the level of innovation of the
whole industry (including Microsoft). 2
As a result, Microsoft must provide its rivals with access to its
protocols. The Monitoring Trustee feels that the protocols involve no
innovative value, but were just arbitrarily selected communications
protocols, and Microsoft should provide access for free. The CFI,
however, found that the Commission could not grant the Trustee the
powers it had, and so perhaps some aspects of his work may be
questioned.
2 Case
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There are many things that could - and will - be said about
the Microsoft judgment.
Let's just look at some questions:
1. Is tying by dominant firms now a per se offence in Europe?
Are all tying cases involving dominant firms essentially essential
facilities cases?
2. On refusal, has the 'new product' requirement been diluted
to that of showing that a refusal to provide access to information
protected by intellectual property rights is preventing the emergence
merely of a 'different' product?
3. On refusal, the court has ruled that a complainant need not
prove that harm to the competitive structure is likely, but that there is
a 'risk' of such harm. Discuss the ramifications for enforcement
policy and priorisation of cases.
4. The Court reminds us in para 664 that direct consumer
harm need not be proven. European case law allows a 'precautionary
principle' by which the 'risk' of harm to the competitive structure of
the market is enough. Nevertheless, competition authorities are
increasingly using consumer welfare as the primary ground for their
intervention. This is the most high profile competition law case in
Europe. What should we make of the fact that not one consumer
rights organisation (and there is at least one in every Member State)
did not intervene in support of the Commission?
5. In para. 664, the CFI ruled that "In this case, Microsoft
impaired the effective competitive structure on the work group server
operating systems market by acquiringa significant market share on
that market." Is there a new abuse being created here, of acquiring
market share?
6. What is likely to be the next big abuse case? Intel, Rambus,
Qualcomm, Google? Do these cases really have anything to do with
the CFI judgment in Microsoft apart from the general deference given
to the Commission in abuse cases? What other industries and areas
are likely candidates for application of the CFI decision's standards
on tying and bundling? What if any new opportunities does the CFI
decision give for private Article 82 litigation?
7. On the day of the decision I commented in the Times that:
"it highlights the fact that divergences remain between Europe and
the US when it comes to technology-driven markets. US courts
would not accept the theories adopted by the Court of First Instance
this morning. This is hardly an ideal regulatory environment for
companies in global technology-driven markets. It leads to difficult
choices: should dominant companies say yes to a demand for
technology from a US rival that has no foundation in US law, but
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which might be accepted in Europe?" Will the CFI decision lead
international firms to confirm their behaviour in all global markets to
the European standard?
8. With respect to compulsory licensing of IP rights, was the
CFI merely applying the "exceptional circumstances" test drawn
from Magill and IMS, or was it expanding it? How did the Court find
that Microsoft had precluded "any effective competition" when its
competitors have a collective market share of approximately 30-40
percent?
9. Did the CFI adopt an speculative "tipping" analysis in
finding that the market share trends demonstrated the inability of
competitors to remain 'viable' without access to Microsoft's IP or a
Commission decision forbidding the bundling of new features? What
are we to make of the acknowledgement at para 1055 that "the
number of new media players and the extent of the use of multiple
media players are continually increasing"?
10. On tying, Ballmer's offer to Monti was to ship Windows
with a CD with all available media players on it. That was rejected.
The abuse found, and upheld by the CFI, was shipping Windows with
Media Player while not making available a version without Media
Player (hence the remedy in Europe, of Windows XPN being
offered). Wasn't the original Ballmer offer better for consumer
choice?

